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Abstract 
 
The existing literature on marriage and fertility decisions pays little attention to the roles 
played by risk preferences and uncertainty.  However, given uncertainty regarding the arrival of 
suitable marriage partners, the ability to contracept, and the ability to conceive, women’s risk 
preferences might be expected to play an important role in marriage and fertility timing 
decisions.   Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I find that measured risk 
preferences have a significant effect on both marriage and fertility timing.  Highly risk tolerant 
women are more likely to delay marriage, consistent with either a search model of marriage or a 
risk-pooling explanation.  In addition, risk preferences affect fertility timing in a way that differs 
by marital status and education, and that varies over the lifecycle.  Greater tolerance for risk 
leads to earlier births at young ages, consistent with these women being less likely to contracept 
effectively.  In addition, as the subgroup of college-educated, unmarried women nears the end of 
their fertile periods, highly risk tolerant women are likely to delay childbearing relative to their 
more risk averse counterparts, and are therefore less likely to become mothers.  These findings 
may have broader implications for both individual and societal well-being.  
  1   
I.  Introduction 
Though extensive, the literature on marriage and fertility decisions has paid little 
attention to the effect of risk preferences and uncertainty on the timing of these decisions.   
Models generally assume that women are risk neutral, and that fertility can be perfectly 
controlled.
1  However, in a world where considerable uncertainty exists regarding the arrival of 
suitable marriage partners, the ability to contracept, and the ability to conceive, women’s risk 
preferences might be expected to play an important role in marriage and fertility timing 
decisions.   
Social scientists have long been interested in individuals’ attitudes towards risk, and the 
effect that these attitudes have on decision-making and behavior.  This interest has led to the 
inclusion of experimental questions in surveys that are designed to provide information about 
individuals’ risk preferences.  These questions generally measure risk preferences by eliciting 
willingness to take a series of gambles over lifetime income, and have been used extensively in 
the literature on savings and wealth.
2,3    
More controversial is the idea that these measures of risk preferences may capture a more 
general risk-taking propensity that could apply to non-financial behavior.  Psychologists have 
long debated whether risk taking is an innate and stable personality trait, or whether it is context-
                                                 
1 See Heckman and Willis (1976) and Michael and Willis (1976) for early exceptions.   
2 Barsky et al. (1997) describe these measures in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and 
the same questions have been asked in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
3 For example, see Lusardi (1998) (wealth accumulation); Brown (2001) (decisions to annuitize); 
Shroder (2001) (decisions to become a landlord); and Charles and Hurst (2003) 
(intergenerational wealth correlations).   
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specific.  Earlier psychology literature argued that behavior is completely situationally 
determined (Mischel, 1968).  More recent work by Hudson et al. (2005) argues that “risk is 
multidimensional, and that no single measure is likely to effectively capture risk preferences in a 
manner that lends itself to applied research (page 48).” 
However, if such a general risk taking propensity exists, it would be expected to affect 
behavior in many different contexts, including marriage and fertility timing decisions.  In this 
paper, I test whether heterogeneity of risk preferences, as measured by differences in the 
willingness to gamble over lifetime income, can help to explain differences in marriage and 
fertility timing across women.
4   
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I find that measured risk 
preferences have a significant effect on both marriage and fertility timing.  Highly risk tolerant 
women are more likely to delay marriage, consistent with either a search model of marriage or a 
risk-pooling explanation.  In addition, risk preferences play a role in fertility timing that differs 
by marital status and education, and that varies significantly over the lifecycle.  Among both 
unmarried and married women, greater tolerance for risk leads to earlier births at young ages, 
consistent with these women being less likely to contracept effectively.  In addition, as the 
subgroup of college-educated, unmarried women nears the end of their fertile periods, those 
                                                 
4 The correlation between these measured risk preferences and demographic behavior may not be 
as tenuous as it first seems.  In an evolutionary framework, systematic differences in risk 
preferences by sex have been attributed to differences in returns to investments in reproductive 
success.  “For females, the low-risk steady-return investment in parenting effort often yields the 
highest returns, whereas for males, the higher-risk investment in mating effort produces a higher 
expected payoff”  (Eckel and Grossman, 2002, page 282).     
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women who have a high tolerance for risk are likely to delay childbearing relative to their more 
risk averse counterparts, and are therefore less likely to become mothers.  This significant link 
between experimental measures of preference parameters and demographic decisions provides 
external validity of these survey risk preference measures, and suggests that they may be more 
broadly applicable beyond the realm of financial decision-making.   
In addition, these findings on the timing of marriage and fertility decisions may have 
broader implications for both individuals and societies.  Early first marriages are more likely to 
lead to divorce.  Early first births are often associated with negative child outcomes, while 
excessive delay of first births could lead to permanent infertility.  Risk preferences may therefore 
have very real effects on well-being. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section IIA explores the potential 
effects of risk preferences on marriage timing.  Section IIB examines the ways in which risk 
preferences may (independently of marriage timing) affect fertility timing.  Section III describes 
the data and Section IV describes the methodology used in the analysis.  Section V presents 
empirical results, and Section VI explores the potential endogeneity of the risk measure.  Section 
VII concludes. 
 
II. How might risk preferences affect marriage and fertility timing?  
A.  Marriage timing 
Different theories would have different predictions regarding the effects of risk tolerance 
on marriage timing.  First, economists have often looked at the marriage timing decision within a 
search-theoretic framework (e.g. Becker, 1974; Becker, Landes, and Michael, 1977; Loughran, 
2002; Schmidt, 2007).  In one-sided search models of marriage, individuals search over a 
  4   
distribution of potential mates for marriage partners.  These search models explicitly incorporate 
uncertainty.  While the distribution of potential mates is known with certainty, the offer drawn 
from the distribution in any given time period is not.  Searchers are generally assumed to be risk 
neutral, and marriage, once entered into, is often assumed to be permanent.  When heterogeneity 
of risk preferences is introduced into these models, individuals who are more risk tolerant will 
have a higher reservation value of an acceptable marriage partner.  They will therefore be less 
likely to find an acceptable mate, and will have, ceteris paribus, a higher age at first marriage.
5  
An alternate explanation that provides the same predictions is risk pooling.  If individuals view 
marriage as a way by which they can self-insure against income risks, then individuals who are 
more risk tolerant would marry later.
6   
However, there are also theories of marriage that would predict the opposite effect of risk 
tolerance.  For example, in a world with high divorce probabilities, those individuals who are the 
least risk tolerant may delay marriage with the hope of finding a better match – one that will 
decrease the probability of divorce.  In this case, risk tolerance would hasten marriage.  In 
addition, the “economic provider” hypothesis suggests that, since men have historically been the 
                                                 
5 Heterogeneity of risk preferences has been introduced into job search models that are analogous 
to the marriage search models.  In a job search model, individuals who are more risk tolerant will 
have a higher reservation wage, and therefore a longer expected duration of unemployment (e.g. 
Pissarides, 1974; Feinberg, 1977). 
6 See literature on the added worker effect in the U.S. (e.g. Cullen and Gruber, 2000; Stephens, 
2002), and an extensive literature showing that family-based income transfers contribute to 
consumption smoothing in developing countries (e.g. Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 
1989; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001).   
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chief financial providers within marriage, decreases in real wages may lead to delays in marriage 
timing (Cooney and Hogan, 1991; Oppenheimer et al., 1997).  If those who are the least tolerant 
of risk prefer to have a larger cushion of savings before marrying, then we would expect to see a 
negative relationship between risk tolerance and age at first marriage – people who were highly 
risk tolerant would marry sooner.
7   
Finally, risk preferences could also affect marriage timing through a “marriage attraction” 
effect.  Assortative mating might occur on risk preferences and other personality traits.  Risk 
tolerance could then either delay or hasten first marriage timing, depending upon the distribution 
of risk preferences in the population.   
In sum, the direction of the predicted effect of risk tolerance on marriage timing is 
ambiguous.  Standard search models and risk-pooling explanations predict that risk tolerance 
would delay marriage.  Explanations associated with match quality and divorce, or the economic 
provider hypothesis would work in the opposite direction, and predict that risk tolerance would 
hasten marriage.  The marriage attraction effect caused by sorting on risk preferences could go in 
either direction.  Since the theoretical effects are ambiguous, it is ultimately an empirical 
question.  In Section V, I test for the effects of risk preferences on marriage timing.  
                                                 
7 The economic provider mechanism is usually associated with male marriage timing decisions.  
The focus of this paper is female marriage timing, but the two are closely linked. 
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B.  Fertility timing 
In a world with imperfect fertility control, a woman deciding on fertility timing must 
consider three costs.
8  First, as in models with perfect fertility control, she incurs the cost of lost 
lifetime earnings from bearing a child, which is a function of the woman’s wage, human capital 
investment, and age.
9   Women who face an increasing earnings profile or whose careers require 
up-front investment in human capital will minimize these costs by choosing to bear children later 
in life.  Women with a relatively flat earnings profile will choose to bear children earlier in life.  
Furthermore, these costs fall as the woman ages.   
However, since fertility is a stochastic process, the timing of the first birth cannot be 
chosen with certainty.  Uncertainty exists regarding the ability to prevent unwanted pregnancies, 
as well as the ability to conceive when desired.  The relevant decision is not really “when to bear 
a child,” but instead “when to stop trying to prevent pregnancy and begin trying to conceive.”
10   
                                                 
8 The existing literature on fertility decisions usually assumes perfect fertility control and risk 
neutrality.  In addition, it has often focused on completed family size rather than fertility timing 
(see Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997) for a recent review). 
9 Both an emerging theoretical literature (e.g. Conesa, 1999; Mullin and Wang, 2002; Caucutt et 
al. 2002) and empirical evidence (e.g. Blackburn et al., 1993; Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 
2005; Miller, 2005) suggest that women can minimize career-related costs associated with 
motherhood by delaying fertility timing.   
10 The ability to delay childbearing to focus on human capital investment requires the ability to 
prevent unwanted pregnancies.  Goldin and Katz (2002) find evidence that the availability of 
contraception and abortion to unmarried women had a significant effect on women’s investment 
in human capital.   
  7   
The second cost the woman incurs is associated with the necessity of preventing early, 
unplanned pregnancies.  Fertility can be controlled through the choice of a particular 
contraceptive technique.  There are monetary costs that depend upon the technique chosen.  In 
addition, there are nonmonetary costs incurred as well, including foregone time, sexual pleasure, 
religious principles, and health (see Michael and Willis, 1976).   These costs are assumed to be 
constant over the woman’s lifecycle. 
Finally, assuming that motherhood provides utility to women, a third cost results from the 
possibility that a woman will be unable to give birth before her fertile period ends, and thereby 
forego the benefits of motherhood.
11  Since effective fecundability declines with age (see 
Weinstein et al., 1990), longer delay of childbearing increases the probability of fertility 
problems, and therefore reduces the probability of an eventual conception.  The expected value 
of this cost increases with age.   
Figure 1 shows how these costs might look over the lifecycle.  The loss of lifetime 
earnings from having a child at a given age decreases as the woman delays childbearing and 
ages.  The expected value of the loss of motherhood increases as a woman delays childbearing 
and ages.   If the cost of contraception is constant over time, the result is a U-shaped pattern of 
costs over the childbearing years.     
For less educated women, the costs of early childbearing in terms of foregone wages are 
low, so as predicted by the models under perfect fertility control, childbearing should take place 
early in life.  This means the remaining two costs should also be less important.  The need to 
contracept effectively is lower.  In addition, since births occur early in life, the constraint 
                                                 
11 The benefits of motherhood are assumed to be positive, and to be sufficiently high that most 
women want to bear a child before the end of their fertile period.   
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imposed by the biological clock is less likely to be binding.  However, for more educated women 
the costs of an early, unplanned pregnancy are high in terms of lost lifetime income.  They would 
therefore choose to delay childbearing in a world of perfect fertility control.  By definition, delay 
requires effective contraception (or abstinence) in early years.    In later years, as the likelihood 
of fertility problems increase, the potential costs of permanent childlessness become increasingly 
important.   
These costs imply that women’s risk preferences will affect fertility timing through two 
mechanisms, and that the relative importance of these two mechanisms will vary over the 
lifecycle.  First, women who are highly risk tolerant may be more willing to sustain high risks of 
an unplanned pregnancy, and therefore contracept less effectively.
12  If this is the case, higher 
levels of risk tolerance would be associated with earlier childbearing.   Since the costs of an 
unplanned pregnancy are highest early in life, during that period, those with the least tolerance 
for risk should be most likely to use effective contraception and therefore see delayed births.   
Second, those individuals who are more tolerant of risk might be less worried about the 
risk of infertility, and therefore delay childbearing longer.  This would imply that risk tolerance 
would be associated with delayed births.  Since the risks of unintended childlessness increase as 
women age, this mechanism should be more important closer to the constraint imposed by the 
biological clock.  
 
                                                 
12 Another possibility is that risk tolerance is associated with early sexual activity or multiple 
sexual partners.  Lundberg et al. (2007) find evicence in the Children of the NLSY data that risk 
attitudes are predictive of subsequent earlier sexual activity.  This could also lead to an increased 
chance of unplanned pregnancy, and would reinforce the effects described above.   
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III.  Data 
The data used in this paper come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The 
PSID began with a national sample of approximately 5,000 U.S. households in 1968.  Since then, 
the PSID has attempted to follow all individuals from those households, including children of the 
original respondents as they begin their own families.  Questions on demographics and 
employment information are asked of all respondents in each year of the survey.
13  In addition, 
family history files are available that can be merged to the main data files.  These files contain 
detailed retrospective marriage and fertility histories of all individuals living in a PSID family in 
any wave beginning with 1985.  These histories provide information such as age at first 
marriage, age at first birth, and whether the first birth to an individual occurred within or outside 
of marriage.  
In 1996, a series of questions regarding hypothetical gambles over lifetime income were 
added to the PSID interview.  These questions are similar to questions asked of respondents in 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) described by Barsky et al. (1997).  Employed 
respondents were first asked the following:  
“Now, imagine that you have a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your 
current, total income.  And that job was your family’s only source of income.  Then, you 
are given the opportunity to take a new, and equally good, job, with a 50-50 chance that it 
will double your income and spending power.  But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut 
your income and spending power by a third.  Would you take the new job?”   
 
Depending on the response to this question, PSID respondents are asked a series of similar 
questions with different percentage income losses.  Based on the responses to these questions, 
individuals can be arranged into ranges based on risk tolerance (the reciprocal of risk aversion).   
Those ranges are then converted into a risk tolerance index that corrects for measurement error 
                                                 
13 For a detailed description of the PSID, see Brown, Duncan and Stafford (1996).   
  10   
using the methodology of Barsky et al. (1997).  Estimates of relative risk tolerance range from 
0.15 to 0.57 (corresponding to levels of risk aversion of 6.67 to 1.75), and 51 percent of the 
women in the sample fall into the least risk tolerant category.
14  These measures are merged with 
individual and family data from 1968 through 2003, and with detailed retrospective marriage and 
fertility histories.  Table 1 presents means of sample characteristics for the full sample of 4,373 
women, as well as separately by educational attainment.
15   
  Table 2 presents means of sample characteristics separately for women with the lowest 
level of risk tolerance versus women with higher levels of risk tolerance.  The first two columns 
show that these two groups of women differ along a number of demographic characteristics.  
Women with the lowest levels of risk tolerance are more likely to be Black or Protestant, and less 
                                                 
14 Individuals in the most risk tolerant of the four categories would accept a gamble with a 50 
percent chance of doubling lifetime income and a 50 percent chance of losing half of lifetime 
income.  Individuals in the least risk tolerant of the four categories would refuse a gamble with a 
50 percent chance of doubling lifetime income and a 50 percent chance of losing one-fifth of 
lifetime income.  For more discussion of the risk measures in the PSID, see Luoh and Stafford 
(1997).    
15 These statistics are for the sample used in the birth timing regressions.  The sample includes 
women who were heads or wives, who had no missing values for either the risk tolerance 
measure or any of the other explanatory variables, including year the woman was born, year she 
first gave birth (for those women who bore children), and year she first married (for those 
women who ever married).  The sample for the marriage timing regressions is slightly larger, 
since there were women with missing birth timing information who had valid marriage timing 
information.   
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likely to be Catholic, or to have a father in a managerial or professional occupation.  However, 
no statistically significant differences by risk tolerance exist in the unadjusted means for either 
marital status or for the probability of ever having given birth.   
  One concern is that the risk questions in the PSID are only asked of the respondent – they 
are not asked of all household members.  More than 90 percent of the unmarried women at each 
educational level responded to the survey.  For married women, however, approximately one-
half of the women in each educational category did not answer the risk questions themselves.  In 
Section V, I address this issue in greater detail.     
An additional concern with this measure of risk tolerance is that the questions were asked 
in 1996, after most of the women in my sample had made their marital and fertility decisions.  As 
long as risk preferences are stable and remain fairly constant over the lifecycle, this will not 
create a problem.  However, it is possible that risk preferences change as individuals age, and 
more importantly that these changes are endogenous to marriage or motherhood.  I address this 
possibility in Section VI.   
 
IV.  Methodology 
  I estimate two sets of discrete time hazard models to separately examine the effect of risk 
preferences on marriage and fertility timing.  The marriage (childbirth) hazard function λ(j|Xit) is 
the probability that woman i in year t will marry (bear a child) at age j, conditional on being 
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The X vector includes individual-level characteristics, such as educational attainment, race, 
religion, region of residence, urban residence, and year of birth dummies to control for any 
cohort effects.
16,17  Duration dependence takes the form of a fourth-order polynomial in t.
18   
 RT measures risk tolerance.
19  As discussed in Section IIA, the predicted effect of risk 
tolerance on marriage timing is ambiguous.  RT will delay marriage if search or risk-pooling 
effects dominate.  It will hasten marriage if match quality or economic provider effects dominate.  
For the childbirth regressions, the expected sign of δ is unclear a priori.  If risk tolerant women 
are less likely to contracept and therefore have earlier first births, δ would be expected to be 
positive.  If instead risk tolerant women are more likely to postpone childbearing since they are 
more willing to gamble over the risk of infertility, then the estimate of δ would be expected to be 
negative.  
                                                 
16 It is possible that risky behaviors such as financial irresponsibility, smoking, and heavy 
drinking are correlated with both measured risk preferences and marriage and fertility timing.  
Since these behaviors are endogenous, I do not include them in my main specification.  
However, all results are robust to inclusion of controls for these variables.  
17 In regression results not reported here, in the regressions for married women I have also 
included spousal characteristics, including spouse’s age and educational attainment.  The 
inclusion of these variables does not affect the results.   
18 Results that allow duration dependence to be fully non-parametric, where each year at risk has 
it its own interval-specific dummy variable, do not differ qualitatively from the results presented 
here.  
19 I use the risk tolerance index created by Barsky et al. (1997) to correct for measurement error.  
However, results are robust to using categorical variables to measure risk tolerance.   
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  In addition, the effects of risk tolerance on fertility timing are expected to differ 
depending on whether the woman is early or late in her fertile period.  Because of this, I also 
estimate a version of the childbirth hazard where the risk tolerance variable is interacted with a 
spline for age – allowing different effects of risk for women under 20, between 20 and 29, and 30 
and older.  The estimated coefficient on RT is predicted to be positive for the youngest women, 
and negative as women near the end of their fertile period.   
To the extent that marriage signals the beginning of a socially sanctioned period for 
childbearing, marriage timing should indirectly affect fertility timing as well.  If risk tolerance 
leads to later marriages, it should correspond to later first births as well.  Because of this, in the 
empirical analysis of fertility timing, all models are run separately for married and unmarried 
women, and the models estimated for married women control for age at first marriage.   
Finally, the risk measures used in this paper have been shown in previous literature to be 
correlated with wealth (e.g. Charles and Hurst, 2003; Mazzocco, 2004).  One concern is that, 
without adding controls for wealth, the risk measures may simply be proxying for wealth effects 
on marriage and fertility timing.  At the individual level, wealth is clearly endogenously 
determined with marriage and fertility decisions, and its inclusion could induce bias.  To address 
this issue, I use parental occupation (with an indicator for whether the woman’s father was in a 
professional or managerial occupation) as a proxy for individual wealth.  This variable should be 
correlated with an individual woman’s wealth, but not endogenously related to her marriage and 
fertility decisions.
20   
                                                 
20 Results are robust to using alternate proxies for wealth, including father’s education and 
indicators for whether the individual considered their family to be wealthy or poor while they 
were growing up.  Results are available from author.   
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V.  Results 
A.  Marriage Timing  
  Estimates of the effect of risk tolerance on the timing of women’s first marriages are 
presented in Column 1 of Table 3.  The demographic variables are, for the most part, statistically 
significant and in the expected direction.  Women who pursue higher levels of education marry 
later, as do Black women.  Women living in urban areas also marry later.  Women who report 
their religious affiliation to be either Jewish or Protestant marry significantly earlier than those 
who report a non-Western religion, Catholicism, or no religion at all.  Even after controlling for a 
wide array of demographic variables, the estimated coefficient on risk tolerance is –0.595, and is 
statistically significant at the one-percent level.  The negative coefficient implies that those who 
have a greater tolerance for risk marry later in life.  This is consistent with dominant search 
model or risk-pooling effects on marriage timing.    Figure 2 graphs the predicted survivor 
functions representing the probability that a woman is unmarried for at least t years.  Predictions 
shown are for a white, college-educated woman born in 1970.  The solid line in each graph 
indicates predictions for the highest level of risk tolerance in the sample, while the dashed line 
represents predictions for the lowest level of risk tolerance.  The survivor functions presented in 
Figure 2 show graphically that risk tolerance delays marriage, and that those who are more risk 
tolerant have a reduced probability of ever marrying.   
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 3 break these results out separately by educational 
attainment.  For all three educational categories, the estimated coefficient is large and negative, 
although it is less precisely determined for college graduates than for the other groups.  For high 
school dropouts, the coefficient is –1.244 and is significant at the ten-percent level.  The 
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magnitude of the coefficient implies that moving from the lowest level of risk tolerance reported 
in the survey to the highest level would delay the median age at marriage for a white, female 
high school dropout born in 1970 by approximately 7 months, from 19 years, 10 months to 20 
years, 5 months of age, and delay the 75
th percentile age at marriage by 11 months, from 21 
years, 11 months to 22 years, 10 months of age.  For high school graduates, the coefficient is 
smaller in magnitude but statistically stronger, with an estimated coefficient of –0.527 that is 
statistically significant at the five-percent level.  For a white high school-educated woman born 
in 1970, moving from the lowest level of risk tolerance in the survey to the highest level would 
delay the median age at marriage by 10 months, from 21 years, 5 months to 22 years, 3 months, 
and delay the 75
th percentile age at marriage by 2 years and 2 mo2nths, from 24 years, 9 months 
to 26 years, 11 months of age.    
Table 3 also presents the incremental pseudo-R
2 associated with adding the risk tolerance 
measure to the regression, and therefore provides some information on the additional amount of 
variation in marriage timing that can be explained by heterogeneity of risk preferences.  While 
the delays in marriage associated with higher risk tolerance discussed in the last paragraph show 
effects that are nonnegligible in magnitude, the additional amount of variation explained by 
adding the risk measure is quite small.  The incremental pseudo-R
2 ranges from 0.0007 for the 
high school and college graduates to 0.0027 for the high school dropouts.  The fact that the risk 
tolerance measures, while statistically significant predictors of the outcome of interest, do not 
explain much of the remaining variation in outcomes, is consistent with other work using these 
measures in the financial literature (e.g. Charles and Hurst, 2003).   
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B.  Fertility timing 
  Table 4 presents results from duration analyses on age at first birth.  I conduct these 
analyses separately for women who were married versus unmarried at the time of the first birth. 
Results for married women are presented in Columns 1 and 2, where Column 1 presents results 
that do not control for age at first marriage.  As the previous section makes clear, risk 
preferences have an independent effect on marriage timing, and might be expected to affect 
fertility timing through this mechanism.  Thus, it is necessary to control for age at first marriage.   
The results in Column 1 show that, for married women, before controlling for age at first 
marriage, education significantly affects fertility timing.  Women with higher levels of education 
are more likely to delay their first birth.  However as Column 2 shows, this effect works entirely 
through the timing of marriage.  Once age at first marriage is controlled for, educational 
attainment has no independent effect on fertility timing.
21   
The effects of risk preferences tell a similar story.  Before controlling for age at first 
marriage, risk tolerance has a negative effect on fertility timing.  The coefficient of –0.239, 
although not statistically different from zero, suggests that women who are more risk tolerant 
have their first births later than those women who are relatively more risk averse.    Column 2 
shows that for married women, earlier age at first marriage, as expected, has a significant effect 
on hastening age at first birth.  However, after controlling for this factor, risk tolerance has no 
independent effect on fertility timing -- the estimate of δ is reduced to approximately one third of 
its original magnitude. 
                                                 
21 In subsequent tables, I only report results from the specification where I control for age at first 
marriage.     
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Results presented in Column 3 for unmarried women show the expected pattern for the 
demographic control variables.  Unmarried women with higher levels of educational attainment 
delay their first births, while Black and Hispanic unmarried women have their first births earlier.  
However, risk tolerance has no significant effect on fertility timing for this group of women.   
There are two competing theoretical effects of risk tolerance on fertility timing that 
should vary in relative importance by age.  Early in the fertile period, risk tolerance is expected 
to hasten first birth timing, since risk tolerant women will be less likely to contracept effectively.  
This should lead to an estimated coefficient that is positive.  Late in the fertile period, risk 
tolerance is expected to delay first birth timing, since risk tolerant women will be less concerned 
about the possible risk of childlessness.  This should lead to an estimated coefficient that is 
negative.  To test whether these differential effects of risk tolerance by age exist, I interact the 
risk tolerance variable with a spline for age, so that risk tolerance can have different effects on 
women under 20, between 20 and 29, and 30 and older.  These results can be found in Table 5.   
For both married and unmarried women, the results suggest that risk tolerance has a 
significant effect on fertility timing, and that this effect differs by age.  For both married and 
unmarried women, the hypotheses that the risk variables are jointly equal to zero and jointly 
equal to each other are each rejected by a chi-square test at at least the five-percent level.  The 
estimated coefficient on risk tolerance for married women under the age of 20 is positive, but not 
precisely estimated.  This is consistent with the story that younger women with higher levels of 
risk tolerance are less likely to contracept effectively.  However, the interaction with over 30 is 
also positive, the opposite sign from what would be expected if the biological clock is playing a 
role.   
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For unmarried women, the effect of risk tolerance on women under 20 is positive and 
significant at the five percent level.  In addition, it is significantly larger than the coefficients for 
the two older age groups.  Again, this is consistent with the idea that those women who are more 
risk tolerant engage in riskier sexual behavior and are more likely to bear children at earlier ages.  
However, as in the marriage regressions, the incremental pseudo-R
2s suggest that the additional 
variation in first birth timing explained by adding the risk measures is very small.   
As explained previously, the differential results of risk tolerance by age should be most 
pronounced for women with steep earnings profiles.  Highly educated women will be most likely 
to delay childbearing, and therefore may be more likely to be influenced by the biological clock.  
Because of this, Table 6 presents regressions with age interactions for women by educational 
level.  For married women at all three levels of education, the risk variables are not jointly 
statistically different from zero.  For high school dropouts and college graduates, the coefficients 
for young women are large and positive, as would be expected – those women who are more risk 
tolerant have earlier first births.  For high school dropouts, the interaction between RT and age 
less than 20 approaches statistical significance at the ten-percent level (p-value=0.111), and for 
college graduates it is statistically significant at the ten-percent level.     
For unmarried women, this positive effect on women under 20 is present for high school 
and college graduates.  For high school graduates, it approaches statistical significance at the ten-
percent level (p-value=0.103).  Finally, at the other end of the fertility horizon, over the age of 30 
risk tolerance plays a large role in delaying childbearing for unmarried college educated women.  
The coefficient on the risk variable for women over 30 is -6.361 and is statistically significant at 
the ten-percent level.   
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Figures 3 and 4 graph the predicted survivor functions, which represent the probability 
that a woman is childless for at least t years.  Predictions shown are for a white, college-educated 
woman born in 1970.  The solid line in each graph indicates predictions for the highest level of 
risk tolerance in the sample, while the dashed line represents predictions for the lowest level of 
risk tolerance.  The survivor functions shown in Figure 3 show that, although the effect of risk 
tolerance hastens births at young ages, the magnitude of this effect is very small.  Less risk 
tolerant women are slightly less likely to become mothers.  However, once age at marriage is 
controlled for, risk preferences have very little effect on the fertility timing of married women.   
For unmarried women, the effects illustrated in Figure 4 are larger (albeit on a much 
smaller base).  Moving from the highest level of risk tolerance to the lowest level has three major 
effects.  First, it delays childbearing at early ages.  Secondly, it hastens the timing of the first 
birth from the age of 30 on.  Finally, it reduces the probability that the woman will remain 
permanently childless.  
Among college-educated women, the stronger effects of risk preferences on the fertility 
timing of unmarried women relative to married women may seem surprising.  However, these 
differences are consistent with theoretical predictions found in Caucutt et al. (2002) and Schmidt 
(2007).  The models in each of these papers predict that high productivity single mothers should 
exhibit the longest delays in fertility timing.  In this type of world, the fertility timing of married 
women is affected by both marriage and the finite nature of the biological clock.  However, the 
fertility timing of unmarried women is primarily driven by the biological clock.  Given the 
greater importance that the biological clock plays for unmarried college educated women, it is 
not surprising that risk tolerance has a stronger effect on their decisions later in life.   
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  As mentioned in Section III, the PSID risk questions are only asked of the respondent. 
Most unmarried women were the respondent in their households, so the results presented above 
are unaffected.  For married women, however, as Table 7 indicates, a significant fraction of the 
women in each educational category did not answer the risk questions themselves.  For these 
women, the risk tolerance measures used in the previous analysis are for their husbands.  If risk 
preferences are highly correlated across spouses, then using the respondent’s risk tolerance as a 
family measure should not dramatically alter the results.
22,23   However, this is a potential 
concern, since respondent status is likely to be correlated with other individual level 
characteristics.  Table 7 provides means of sample characteristics for married women by 
education and respondent status, and shows that married women who are respondents are more 
likely to be Black and to have given birth, more likely to be Protestant and less likely to be 
Catholic, and have lower levels of risk tolerance.  They are also less likely to have fathers who 
were in professional and managerial occupations.  Because of these differences, in Table 8 I 
                                                 
22 In Wave 1 of the HRS (1992), of those primary respondents in the least risk tolerant category, 
70 percent had secondary respondents (usually their spouse or domestic partner) who were also 
in the least risk tolerant category.  This suggests that risk tolerance is correlated to some extent 
across spouses.  However, married couples in the HRS are likely to have been married for many 
years, and therefore may not be representative of married couples in the PSID.   
23 Research in psychology suggests that there are moderate positive and statistically significant 
correlations between spouses on sensation-seeking in the range of 0.30 – 0.40, which are similar 
in size to correlations found on attractiveness (see Bratko and Butković (2002) and Glicksohn 
and Golan (2001)).  
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present results in which the married sample is further stratified into respondents and 
nonrespondents.   
  Column 1 reprints the results for all married women from Table 6 for reference.  Column 
2 presents results for the women who were respondents (i.e. they answered the risk questions 
themselves), and Column 3 presents results for those women who were not the respondents (i.e. 
someone else in the household – usually the spouse – answered the risk questions for them).  
When regressions are run only for those married women who answered the risk questions 
themselves, the hastening effect of risk tolerance on fertility timing of women under the age of 
20 becomes stronger for all education categories.  The results in Column 3 for nonrespondents 
show no effects of risk preferences on fertility timing at any level.   
Ideally in duration analysis, the right hand side variables would be fully time-varying.  
However, since the marriage and fertility histories in the PSID are retrospective, I do not have a 
true panel data set.  This problem affects the educational status variables, which are important for 
stratifying the sample.
24  To test the sensitivity of the results to the time at which educational 
attainment is measured, I have limited the sample to those individuals for whom I have data on 
                                                 
24 This problem also affects region of residence and the measure of risk tolerance.  Due to the 
importance of the risk tolerance measure as my independent variable of interest, I address this 
separately in the next section.  Large regional differences exist in marriage and fertility timing 
that might capture the effects of other omitted variables.  To proxy for these regional differences, 
I have run regressions using the 1993 value for region of residence, as well as regressions that 
control for the region of residence of the original PSID household in 1968.  The results are not 
substantively affected by the choice of regional variable.   
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educational attainment at the time of their marriage and fertility decisions.  Results are robust to 
this alternate specification.
25     
The kinks in the survivor functions are a result of constraining the effect of risk tolerance 
to be the same for women in each of the three segments of the spline (less than 20, 20-29, and 30 
and older).  However, these cut points for the age interactions are somewhat arbitrary.  One 
might wonder whether different cut points affect the results.  To look at whether the cut points 
matter, I have run regressions where instead of defining the cut points at 20 and 30, I allow for 
year-specific interactions with risk tolerance (essentially allowing risk to have a different effect 
in each year).  These regressions have less power due to the reduction in degrees of freedom, but 
provide a useful picture of the pattern of risk and fertility timing.  The predicted survivor 
functions provide evidence that the predicted patterns are not dependent upon the choice of cut 
points.
26   
 
VI.  Is Measured Risk Tolerance Endogenous?   
                                                 
25 Results are available from the author.  These results are similar to those found in Tables 8 and 
9, with one exception.  When I stratify by educational attainment at the time of the birth, I no 
longer have high school graduates who had their first birth at an age younger than 17.   Likewise, 
I no longer have college graduates who had their first birth at an age younger than 21.  By 
stratifying the sample in this way, each educational category only contains those women who 
were successful at preventing unwanted pregnancies until they completed the educational level in 
question.  As a result, the positive effect of risk tolerance at early ages is present for high school 
dropouts, but becomes attenuated for women with higher levels of education.   
26 These results are available from the author.   
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Ideally, questions aimed at quantifying risk tolerance would be asked in the PSID before 
the marriage and or fertility decisions were made.  If measured risk tolerance reflects a stable 
personality trait, then this will not bias my results.  However, it is possible that risk preferences 
change endogenously with major life events, like marriage or motherhood.  If women become 
less tolerant of risk after marrying or having children, this reverse causality could bias my results 
– women who were more risk tolerant would show up as having later marriages and births, when 
in fact the lower levels of risk tolerance were caused by the transitions to marriage and 
motherhood and not vice-versa.    
Three main findings emerge from the results presented in the previous section – first, 
those women who are more risk tolerant marry later; second, that risk tolerance hastens first 
births early in the lifecycle; and third, that for college-educated unmarried women, risk tolerance 
delays first births as women approach the end of their fertile period.  The reverse causality 
argument in the last paragraph could potentially explain the marriage timing results, and the 
“biological clock” fertility effect at the end of the fertile period.  However, it would not explain 
the strongest fertility effect – that risk tolerance hastens fertility timing for young women under 
the age of 20.  This suggests that reverse causality is not the only explanation for my results.     
The risk questions were only asked once in the PSID, so it is impossible to examine 
whether a given individual changes their response to the risk questions over time and to rule out 
such endogeneity.   However, work by Charles and Hurst (2003) using these measures in the 
PSID shows a correlation between the risk preferences of parents and the risk preferences of 
their children (and a strong correlation for those who are either very risk averse or very risk 
tolerant), which implies some stability of these preference measures over time.   
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In addition, the equivalent questions were asked on several occasions in the Health and 
Retirement Study.
27  Detailed analysis of the HRS risk questions by Sahm (2006) suggests that 
the questions do measure stable and well-defined preferences.  For example, she finds that 
personal events that would reduce an individual’s expected lifetime income (such as job 
displacement or diagnosis of a serious health condition) seem to have little impact on risk 
tolerance.  However, she does find a link between marriage and measured risk tolerance, but in 
the opposite direction of that suggested above -- individuals entering a marriage show an 
increase in risk tolerance.
28  
As an additional test for the exogeneity of risk preferences to the childbearing decision, I 
examine the subsample of women who are likely to have completed their childbearing (women 
older than 45) in the PSID, to see if there is a relationship between ever having had a child and 
risk preferences.  If risk preferences endogenously change with motherhood such that mothers 
are less tolerant of risk, we would expect that motherhood would be negatively and significantly 
correlated with risk tolerance.  Table 9 shows results from estimation of a linear probability 
model, where an indicator for whether the woman ever had a child is regressed on the RT 
measure, as well as on individual characteristics.  This regression shows that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between measured risk tolerance and the likelihood of 
motherhood.   
 
                                                 
27 However, the HRS sample is made up of older individuals, and may not be the best sample for 
comparison.   
28 Sahm does find that less risk tolerant types are more likely to be consistently married in the 
panel, but this relates more directly to divorce than to marriage timing.   
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VII.  Conclusion 
A large and growing literature examines the role risk preferences play in influencing 
individual decision-making, and experimental questions designed to measure such risk 
preferences have become popular additions to surveys.   Despite skepticism over the existence of 
a general risk-taking propensity, this paper shows that the PSID’s measure of risk preferences, 
determined by asking a series of questions about willingness to gamble over lifetime income, has 
predictive power in the non-financial context of demographic decisions.   
Risk preferences are found to have a significant effect on marriage timing, with highly 
risk tolerant women likely to delay marriage.  In addition, risk preferences play a role in fertility 
timing that varies by age, marital status, and education.  Among both unmarried and married 
women, greater tolerance for risk leads to earlier births at young ages, consistent with these 
women being less likely to contracept effectively.  As college-educated unmarried women near 
the end of their fertile period, those women who have a high tolerance for risk are likely to delay 
childbearing relative to their more risk averse counterparts.  These findings further validate the 
PSID risk measures, and could have broader implications for both individual and societal well-
being.  Early marriages are more likely to end in divorce, and early first births are often 
associated with negative child outcomes.  In addition, by affecting fertility timing, differences in 
risk preferences may lead to differences in the incidence of infertility problems and potential 
childlessness.  Due to these effects, it is even more critical to understand the role that risk 
preferences play in these demographic decisions.     
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Table 1: Means of Sample Characteristics, By Educational Attainment 
 













Marital  Status  0.684 0.530 0.685 0.777 
Birth      0.429  0.469  0.438  0.377 
Father’s occupation was 
professional/managerial 
0.140 0.046 0.109 0.294 
Black    0.311 0.445 0.329 0.169 
Hispanic  0.039 0.051 0.038 0.032 
Jewish  0.022 0.005 0.011 0.067 
Protestant  0.691 0.787 0.701 0.597 
Catholic  0.208 0.136 0.210 0.247 
Urban  0.679 0.592 0.677 0.743 
      
Number  of  Observations  4373 605 2838 930 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  The statistics presented are mean values for the variables.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Means of Sample Characteristics, by Risk Tolerance and Educational Attainment 
 
 

















Marital  Status  0.670 0.685 0.531 0.474 0.677 0.682 0.767 0.789 
Birth          0.445 0.426 0.526 0.491 0.441 0.439 0.386 0.359 
Father’s occupation was 
professional/managerial 
0.115*** 0.166  0.051  0.038  0.095**  0.124 0.240*** 0.337 
Black    0.341*** 0.279  0.437  0.457  0.345*  0.311 0.240*** 0.111 
Hispanic  0.035 0.043 0.046 0.060  0.032*  0.044 0.034 0.031 
Jewish  0.019 0.025 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.008  0.046**  0.084 
Protestant  0.722***  0.657 0.817** 0.739 0.718** 0.683  0.655***  0.550 
Catholic  0.184*** 0.234  0.113**  0.171 0.191*** 0.231  0.221*  0.269 
Urban  0.669 0.690 0.596 0.585 0.677 0.677  0.705**  0.774 
          
High  School  Dropout  0.165***  0.110  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
High  School  Graduate  0.649  0.649  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
College  Graduate  0.186***  0.241  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
            
Sample  size  2245  2128 371  234 1457  1381 417  513 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  Means are statistically different at the following levels: *** at the one-percent level; ** at the five-
percent level; and * at the ten-percent level. 
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Table 3: Effects of Risk Tolerance on Hazard of First Marriage 
 
  All Women    High School 
Dropouts 














High School Graduate  -0.609 
(0.096) 
***  --  --  --  
College Graduate  -1.244 
(0.108) 
***  --  --  --  

































































          
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0010  0.0027  0.0007  0.0007  
Sample size   4470    589    2782    1099   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions also control for region of residence and year of birth dummy variables.  Duration 
dependence takes the form of a fourth-order polynomial in t.  PSID core weights are used.  Levels of statistical significance: *** 




Table 4: Effects of Risk Tolerance on Hazard of First Birth 
 
 Married  Women 
 
Unmarried Women 







Age at Marriage  --    -0.084 
(0.009) 
*** --   

































































          
Incremental Pseudo R
2 0.0001   0.0000    0.0000   
Sample  size  2948   2948   1384  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions also control for region of residence and year 
of birth dummy variables.  Duration dependence takes the form of a fourth-order polynomial in t.  
Educational attainment is measured as of 1996.  PSID core weights are used.  Levels of statistical 
significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** at the five-percent level; and * 
at the ten-percent level.    
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Table 5: Effects of Risk Tolerance on Hazard of First Birth with Age Interactions 
 
 Married      Unmarried   















      
2 χ for parameter tests on risk variables     
RT20=Rtmid   
2 χ (1)  5.20 ** 10.54  *** 
Rtmid=RT30   
2 χ (1)   4.45 ** 0.03   
Vars jointly 0 
2 χ (3)  8.46 ** 11.11  ** 
Vars all equal 
2 χ (2)  8.37 ** 10.94  *** 
      
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0007  0.0029  
Sample size  2948  1384  
See notes for Table 4.   
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Table 6: Effects of Risk Tolerance on Hazard of First Birth 
With Age Interactions, by Educational Attainment 
 
 Married    Unmarried   
A. High School Dropouts     















2 χ for parameter tests on risk variables     
RT20=Rtmid 
2 χ (1)  3.90 ** 9.72  *** 
Rtmid=RT30  
2 χ (1)   0.31  0.44  
Risk vars jointly 0 
2 χ (3)  4.90  9.93  ** 
Risk vars all equal 
2 χ (2)  3.93  9.90  *** 
        
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0037  0.0118  
Sample size  315    284   
        
B.  High School Graduates     















2 χ for parameter tests on risk variables     
RT20=Rtmid   
2 χ (1)  0.96  3.24  * 
Rtmid=RT30   
2 χ (1)   0.54  1.03  
Risk vars jointly 0  
2 χ (3)  2.70  4.95  
Risk vars all equal 
2 χ (2)  1.32  3.90  
        
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0003  0.0019  
Sample size  1916    893   
        
C: College Graduates     















2 χ for parameter tests on risk variables     
RT20=Rtmid   
2 χ (1)  2.19  0.01  
Rtmid=RT30   
2 χ (1)   0.09  3.67  *    
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2 Risk vars jointly 0  χ (3)  2.91  4.24  
Risk vars all equal 
2 χ (2)  2.43  4.22  
        
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0010  0.0176  
Sample size  717    207   
Notes: See notes for Table 4. 
    
 
Table 7: Means of Sample Characteristics for Married Women, Respondents versus Nonrespondents 
 
 
  HS Dropouts  HS Graduates  College Grads 
  Resp Nonresp Resp Nonresp Resp Nonresp 
        
RT  0.250  0.244 0.262*** 0.288 0.274*** 0.319 
Birth          0.554*** 0.344 0.482*** 0.411 0.506*** 0.405 
Father’s occupation was 
professional/managerial 
0.034*  0.084 0.097*** 0.157  0.281  0.329 
Black    0.309**  0.198 0.273*** 0.151 0.177*** 0.084 
Hispanic  0.057 0.053 0.035 0.047 0.030 0.031 
Jewish  0.006 0.008 0.014 0.014  0.051**  0.099 
Protestant  0.766  0.779 0.697* 0.657  0.629**  0.543 
Catholic  0.154  0.137 0.215** 0.261  0.216***  0.298 
Urban  0.549 0.504 0.670 0.671  0.698**  0.778 
        
Sample  size  180 135  1010  906 332 385 
Percent  respondent  57.1%  52.7%  46.3%  
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  Means are statistically different at the following levels: *** at the one-percent level; ** at the 
five-percent level; and * at the ten-percent level. 
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Table 8: Effects of Risk Tolerance on Hazard of First Birth for Married Women, Respondents versus Nonrespondents 
 
  All Married Women  Respondents  Nonrespondents 
A. High School Dropouts       





















        
2 χ for parameter tests on risk variables       
RT20=Rtmid 
2 χ (1)  3.90 ** 3.61  *  0.00   
Rtmid=RT30  
2 χ (1)   0.31  2.67  2.21  
Risk vars jointly 0 
2 χ (3)  4.90  8.78  **  2.40  
Risk vars all equal 
2 χ (2)  3.93  7.09  **  2.39  
        
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0037  0.0074  0.0034  
Sample  size  315  180  135  
        
B. High School Graduates       





















        
2 χ for parameter tests on risk variables       
RT20=Rtmid 
2 χ (1)  0.96  3.87  **  0.30  
Rtmid=RT30  
2 χ (1)   0.54  0.09  2.04  
Risk vars jointly 0 
2 χ (3)  2.70  6.21    3.01  
  39 40 
   
 
Risk vars all equal 
2 χ (2)  2.43  3.61  1.38  
        
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0010  0.0029  0.0013  
Sample  size  717  332  385  
Risk vars all equal 
2 χ (2)  1.32  4.16  2.59  
        
Incremental Pseudo-R
2 0.0003  0.0012  0.0010  
Sample  size  1916  1010   906   
        
C. College Graduates       





















        
2 χ for parameter tests on risk variables       
RT20=Rtmid 
2 χ (1)  2.19  3.50  *  0.64  
Risk vars jointly 0 
2 χ (3)  2.91  5.32  1.61  
Rtmid=RT30  
2 χ (1)   0.09  0.39  0.71  





Table 9: Effect of Risk Tolerance on the Likelihood that a Woman  
Older than 45 Ever Had a Birth 
 




Marital status  0.199 
(0.025) 
*** 
High school graduate  -0.009 
(0.027) 
 
College graduate  -0.070 
(0.034) 
** 






    
Sample Size  2289   
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the woman ever had a birth.  Coefficients are from linear 
probability model on a sample of those women over the age of 45.  Regression also controls for Hispanic ethnicity, 
religious affiliation, and urban status.  Levels of statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent 





Costs over the Lifecycle
EV of Loss of Motherhood Benefit
Loss in Lifetime Earnings
Total Costs
age




Probability of Remaining Unmarried until Age t, 
White College Educated Woman Born in 1970 
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Figure 3 
Probability of Remaining Childless until Age t, 
Married White Woman Born in 1970 
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Figure 4 
Probability of Remaining Childless until Age t, 
Unmarried White Woman Born in 1970 
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